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Introduction 
In terms of aggregate density, trade unions in western Europe are weakest there 
where the bulk of overall employment is found: in the private service sector (IRS 
1997; Eurostat 1998; Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000; Dølvik and Waddington 
2002). Privatisation of public services and outsourcing in manufacturing will 
further erode employment in traditional areas of membership strength. Therefore 
the challenge is clear: if unions want to avoid further decline they have to 
organise and recruit where the potential for growth can be found. 
In retail - in terms of employment the biggest single service industry - overall 
densities add to the picture of low trade union membership levels in private 
services. In 1998 only 10% of the retail workforce in Germany were in any union 
and HBV reached an overall density of 7,3%.1 In Britain the LFS reported in 1999 
a trade union density of 14%. Usdaw organised about 10% of all retail employees 
in the same year. In the Netherlands trade union membership was weakest - FNV 
Bondgenoten achieved a density in retail of only 6% in 1998 (to which about 1% 
membership density of the Christian CNV can be added). 
But as Bain and Price put it: 
"The inability to produce highly detailed disaggregations sometimes results in the 
significance of unionism in a particular sector being obscured because [...] 
areas of widely differing degrees of unionization are combined to give an overall 
density figure [...]." (Bain/Price 1980, 9) 
The aim of the paper is to take a closer look behind the curtain of low aggregate 
trade union densities in retail and to outline the major obstacles and problems 
trade union organising faces in the retail trades. 
Trade union organising and recruitment is analysed against the background of a 
'two hurdle model of organising' (cf. Haas 2000, Dribbusch 2003) derived from 
explanations on trade union membership put forward by Green (1990) and 
Disney (1990). Within this framework the first hurdle to be taken is the 
establishment of a workplace presence as a precondition for any sustainable 
membership development. The second hurdle is then to convince the potential 
members in the workplace to join i.e. the recruitment.  
To perform the task of organising, the unions have to struggle with structural 
constraints, but they act as well as "architects of their own destiny" (Frege 1999) 
having a wide range of alternative policies at their disposal (cf. Heery et al 2000). 
                                            
1 All given densities for Germany and the Netherlands are net densities thus calculated on the basis of employed members only. As 
for Usdaw the union does not record a separate figure for unemployed members but assumes that there are hardly any. The 
pensioners are not included in the calculated density. 
  
Therefore, an analysis of trade union organising attempts and subsequent 
successes will have to combine both "structuralist" and "interventionist" 
perspectives (cf. Mason and Bain 1993; Kelly 1997). As organising and 
recruitment is a potentially contentious issue between unions and employers, the 
balance of power between the two parties has to be taken into account as well 
(cf. Kelly and Waddington 1995, Hyman 1996). 
The structural power of shop workers is weak as most of them are relatively easy 
to replace and the dispersion and fragmentation of the workforce make it 
particularly difficult to develop “associational power” (Wright 2000). The argument 
put forward is that despite structural obstacles organising and recruitment in retail 
is possible but that to successfully manage unionisation for more than a minority 
of workers will require institutional support through statutory protection and 
encouragement of trade union membership. 
This paper is based on the findings of a major research study on trade union 
membership and organising in retail (Dribbusch 2003). The study focuses on the 
Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (Usdaw), the former Gewerkschaft 
Handel, Banken und Versicherungen (HBV) in Germany which merged with other 
unions in summer 2001 to build the 'Unified Union in the Service Sector' Vereinte 
Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft, ver.di2 and the Dutch FNV Bondgenoten 
(respectively its predecessor until 1998 the FNV Dienstenbond). All three are by 
far the biggest unions in the retail industry in Germany, Great Britain and the 
Netherlands. 
Trade union data was used during the research to explore in some depth the 
development and structure of trade union membership in the retail trades. 
Furthermore it is based on more than 60 interviews with experts from the three 
unions. Those interviews included the leading national officials responsible for 
organising, full-time officers from the areas and districts and lay officials from 
different stores in each country.  
Trade union density and trade union availability 
A closer look at membership distribution and disaggregated trade union densities 
reveals that in all three selected countries the state of the unions is similar to the 
situation in British retail in the early 90s:  
                                            
2 Ver.di was established in 2001. The union resulted out of a merger of the public services and transport workers union ÖTV, the 
post workers union DPG, the print and media workers union IG Medien and the white collar union DAG - the latter not being 
affiliated to the German trade union federation DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) before. The union organises a wide range 
of employees in both public and private services and started with about 2.9 million members and 5,000 staff. Membership in 
retail stood at the beginning of 2001 approximately at 357.000 (including pensioners and unemployed members). 
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"Trade union membership, rather than being described as low, is more accurately 
described as highly uneven." (Doogan 1992, 38-39) 
The most evident example is Usdaw where about 40% of the retail membership 
(including mail-order) is found within one company (Tesco). In addition, the union 
has a remarkable presence in some outlets of other big food retailers and still has 
strong membership pockets in the Co-op sector: In contrast to that, the union has 
no presence at all in companies where no recognition exists. This is particularly 
the case in the non-food sector. Densities vary accordingly. We can find in some 
extraordinary well organised workplaces 90% or more density and in others nil. 
Between those extremes there is a range of outlets with union presence. 30% 
density is estimated by officials to be a good average in places where the union 
has achieved recognition and shop stewards are active, but no explicit employer 
assistance for recruitment exists. 
A similar picture is found in Germany. Although trade union membership is 
spread more evenly throughout the industry than in Britain (which is basically due 
to the effects of a different industrial relations framework) there are remarkable 
differences in workplace densities. Especially big department stores and 
Superstores are often very well organised with some outlets reaching the 
80% margin and many others ranging around 40% union density. Membership in 
other workplaces is considerably lower and in a high number of workplaces 
without works councils densities are extremely low. Nevertheless, since the 
industrial relations framework allows for individual representation and bargaining 
coverage is not linked to the existence of works councils, individual membership 
in places without organised union presence is not as exceptional as in Britain.3 
In the Netherlands membership is more evenly distributed than in Britain and 
Germany, albeit on a low level. However, remarkable differences between stores 
are found here as well. In particular, density in some food retail stores and some 
so-called variety stores is well above the average, as well as in some of the 
traditional department stores.  
As in Germany union membership is not bound to places with organised union 
structures, although officials reported a positive correlation between an organised 
presence and workplace densities. 
                                            
3 There is no figure for the total share of union members in unorganised workplaces but in a local district which was closer 
examined during the study it reached 25% of the total retail membership. Those were spread over a wide range of workplaces. 
The established way of collecting union dues through direct debit and the transferability of union membership between the 
unions who are affiliated to the DGB helps to maintain membership when employment is changed.  
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The uneven pattern of membership distribution in retail supports the assumption 
that the low aggregate union density is not the result of a particularly low 
propensity to join amongst service employees, but the outcome of an overall low 
union availability. Thus the problem of trade unions in retail is not the lack of 
demand for union representation, but the supply of it (cf. Green 1990). 
The interviewed full-time officials of all three unions agreed that organised trade 
union presence is the precondition for any sustainable membership development. 
The absence of trade union representatives is therefore the main explanation for 
workplaces having no, or very few, members. 
Commitment to organising and recruitment 
By looking at trade union density at the level of the single outlet, differences can 
be observed between outlets which have both an organised union representation 
and similar employment structures. Those differences can in some cases be 
explained by a particular resistance to recruitment by local managers. In general, 
however, as has been observed in Germany, it is the personal commitment, 
charisma and credibility of the trade union representative in situ which makes the 
difference (Rozsai, 1997). Heery et al. (2000) identify the commitment to trade 
union growth and the existence of a formal policy of organising as a prerequisite 
of membership development. 
Following a change in leadership Usdaw has enforced a concerted central and 
proactive approach to membership development. Organising and recruitment are 
clearly the number one priorities in trade union activity and have considerable 
funds allocated accordingly. In almost all union publications organising and 
recruitment activities are highlighted and they are regularly featured at the Annual 
Delegate Meetings. Activists are constantly encouraged to recruit and officials are 
expected to devote a considerable part of their time budget to organising 
activities. 
In contrast to Usdaw the FNV Bondgenoten does not display such strong 
commitment. The union gives organising and recruitment activities a comparably 
low profile in its publications. Of course the union wishes to grow, but when 
browsing through the union magazines one gets the impression that this is to be 
achieved more by publicising additional membership benefits than through trade 
union organising activities in the proper sense. The prevalent approach seems to 
be widely reactive and similar to what is described by Kelly and Heery (1994) as 
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‘passive recruitment’.4 Officials agree that organising has a considerably lower 
profile than in Anglo-Saxon countries. This is attributed to an institutional 
framework which gives the unions considerable consultation and bargaining 
rights which are not necessarily linked to membership strength (cf. Teulings 
1996).5 
The HBV is situated somewhat in the middle between the Usdaw and the FNV - 
in the sense that very active and rather passive approaches to organising and 
recruitment coexist. The HBV has no central organising approach comparable to 
Usdaw. In the union publications organising and recruitment activities are seldom 
featured. This is due to the federalist structure of the union6 which allows for a 
strong autonomy of the regional and local union bodies. In the end it is the 
commitment of the full-time officials at local and regional level that counts, they 
decide how expansive the union should be and where the priorities are to be set. 
Co-ordination and an organised exchange of experiences in organising happens 
only occasionally. 
Structural constraints to organising in retail 
The retail industry is characterised by the coexistence (albeit not always 
peaceful) of some economically very powerful retail companies and a great 
number of small enterprises. In the 1990s, 90% of retail businesses in Britain and 
Germany had not more than 10 employees and in the year 2000 80% of Dutch 
retail businesses had only one outlet (Dribbusch 2003, 64). But the market is not 
controlled by this large number of of shop owners . Retail is marked by a 
concentration process which led to the emergence of oligopolies (Howe 1992; 
Tilaart 1993; Kirsch et al. 1999). The concentration of economic power is 
particularly marked in food-retail (Schüttpelz and Deniz 2001), where in 1996 the 
three leading food retailers had a market share of 40% in Great Britain, 43% in 
Germany and 46% in the Netherlands (Kirsch et al 1999, 18). 
Whereas economic power is concentrated, the work force is very much dispersed 
and fragmented. These structural constraints are by far the biggest obstacle to 
trade union organising in retail (Dribbusch 2004). The fragmentation is first of all 
                                            
4 In 2000 two pilot projects were carried out in two shopping centres which the aim to do cold recruitment through a mixed team of 
full-time officials and lay representatives. These pilots were considered a failure so far. The employees showed interest but the 
project delivered no results in terms of membership. 
5 The head of the FNV federation Lodewijk de Waal agreed with Teulings' (1996) argument that it would not be desirable if the 
unions were be too strong as this would damage the attitude to compromise within the Dutch institutional setting ("Hoge 
organisatiegraad is niet goed." in: Financieele dagblad, 30 januari 1998).  
6 This trade union structure which follows the federal structure of Germany is continued after the merger in ver.di. 
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the result of the dispersion of the workforce across a very high number of retail 
outlets with relatively few employees. Even very big retail outlets rarely number 
more than a couple of hundred employees and many establishments employ 
considerably less. The retail structure in the three countries differs in detail but in 
principle the problems to be adressed by trade union organising are the same.In 
the mid 1990s, 30% of employees in the Dutch and German retail industries and 
a quarter of British retail employees worked for retail enterprises with less than 10 
employees, but to explore the full extent of dispersion it is necessary to move 
away from the enterprise and to focus on the workplace, because even the big 
retail giants with tens of thousands of employees on their pay-roll are split into a 
large number of outlets and stores, which might sometimes only number a 
handful of employees. 
In the year 1997 in British retail, 32% of employees worked at workplaces with 
not more than 10 employees, another 32% at workplaces with between 11 and 99 
employees and about 36% in the bigger retail outlets with more than 100 
employees. 2.2 million employees were scattered over 249,000 workplaces. 
Nevertheless, it has to be commented, that comparatively large outlets are more 
common in British retail than in Germany or the Netherlands. 
In Germany, for which recent disaggregated data is not available, the structure of 
the industry in the 1990s was characterised even more by the small outlet. In 
1993, 49% of employees worked in outlets or stores with less than ten employees 
and only 14.4% worked in outlets having 100 or more employees. Overall, 2.7 
million employees were dispersed over 487,000 workplaces. 
In the Netherlands in 1999, 112,000 retail enterprises had only one single outlet 
whereas another 9,000 enterprises owned another 37,000 outlets, so that the 
575,000 Dutch retail employees were scattered over 149,000 outlets (Dribbusch 
2003). In food retail the average supermarket is rather small compared with 
British retail and there are only very few big superstores and hypermarkets 
(Kirsch et al 1999).  
In all three countries the retail outlets with the biggest workforce used to be 
traditionally the department stores. Rationalisation and restructuring, however, 
have lead to cuts in employment and most of German department stores now 
have less than 500 and often less than 300 employees (Dribbusch 2003, 65). A 
particular feature of many British department stores is that, according to Usdaw 
representatives, often only a minority of employees still works for the department 
store itself whereas most of the staff are employed by franchise-companies. 
Similar trends towards in-house outsourcing have been observed in German 
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retail, where often the restaurants and sometimes large parts of the food-
departments are sourced out to other companies (Wirth 1999). Of major 
importance in terms of size of employment are now, especially in Great Britain 
the big hypermarkets. In Germany, however, food supermarkets usually employ 
fewer than 50 employees (Kirsch et al. 1999) and the outlets of the big discount-
chains employ considerably fewer shop workers. The big chemist chain 
Schlecker, which in 1997 had 6,360 outlets, usually employs three employees per 
outlet, of which two are part-timers. Low staffing levels are also common in 
outlets of chains for stationery articles (where the shift often comprises only one 
employee) and in convenience stores. 
In all three countries the geographical fragmentation of the workforce is the 
obvious pattern that makes retail a different ground for organising compared with 
yesterday’s strongholds of unionism in mass manufacturing. Even when trade 
union access is secured through recognition or legislation, the establishment of a 
workplace structure in retail remains difficult because it requires a high input of 
resources by the union as numbers of workplaces are high. The limitation of 
available resources usually leads to a selective approach – in general targeting 
the biggest of the retail outlets first and giving in-fill recruitment a priority over 
green field expansion. This of course fosters the uneven distribution of 
membership. The high number of small outlets implies the problem of prohibitive 
costs. Organising (and servicing) of highly fragmented workplaces may require 
more money than will flow back through contributions (cf. Streeck and Visser 
1997). Cross subsidy of trade union organising is therefore an issue to be 
considered. 
 Not only is fragmentation a problem but also the fact that trade union activists 
must not only have the personal commitment and skills to represent workers but 
also have to be prepared to face any trouble which might occur, particularly 
during the early stages of an often controversial organising process (cf. Hoffmann 
and Neumann 1987, 294-295). The total number of activists required to build a 
network to cover all workplaces rises with the number of outlets, however the 
chance to find committed activists decreases with the size of the establishment 
because the potential for activists is smaller.  
A regional Usdaw officer estimated that in his division, the unions had no 
stewards in more than two thirds of the outlets for which recognition existed. The 
same situation can be found in Germany where the chance to have a works 
council is greatest in big single retail outlets and considerably lower in highly 
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fragmented discount chains.7 Furthermore, the small size of the workplaces in 
retail affects the facilities available to lay officials as some may be related to the 
number of employees. 8 This makes it more difficult for lay representatives to 
develop trade union professionalism. 
Not only organising, but also recruitment, suffers from fragmentation as the 
workforce is not only splitin the territory but also at the workplace. Extended 
opening hours and sophisticated systems of staffing have led to the emergence 
of a highly casualised workforce which is often bound to very detailed and flexible 
rota systems. As a consequence, usually only a small proportion of the total 
number of employees are present at any given time – thus making any personal 
approach to all employees by full-time staff impossible and a difficult task even for 
workplace representatives. 
The structure of the industry raises the very fundamental question of whether the 
traditional workplace approach in organising, recruitment and servicing of 
members is appropriate in a fragmented industry such as retail, at least if the 
union does not want to stick to only the biggest outlets. The dilemma is that it is at 
the workplace where members are most effectively won and where they expect 
the union to be present in case a problem occurs. Unfortunately the high number 
of outlets makes this very unlikely to happen in many cases. The solution is 
therefore to develop some kind of trade union availability which is not in each and 
every case bound to the particular workplace. 
Fragmentation of the workforce 
Despite resistance from shop workers, legal restrictions on shop opening times 
have been relaxed over the last decade in all three countries (Kirsch et al. 1999; 
Dribbusch 2003). While longer opening hours would usually require more staff, 
retail companies have a strong interest to win a cost advantage over competitors 
by maintaining or even decreasing the share of personnel costs in sales (Jany-
Catrice and Lehndorff 2002). This promotes an increasing disconnection of shop 
opening and individual working times and leads to an ever more flexible 
workforce (e.g. Schüttpelz and Deniz 2001). Electronic data processing allows for 
                                            
7 For the 1998 elections the HBV counted a total number of 2,300 works councils in German retail of which only 300 in Eastern 
Germany. These works councils have about 12,600 members of which 64% are members of the HBV. The works councils 
represent approximately a quarter of all retail employees. 
8 In Germany the threshold to have at least one fully seconded member of the works council is at the moment at 300 employees. 
The government plan to reduce this threshold to 200 employees, what will have a considerable impact on the facilities in retail 
as many works councils have less than 300 employees in their constituency (the unions would have liked the threshold to be 
reduced even further to 100 employees). 
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real-time control of sales and stocks and helps to establish sophisticated working 
time regimes which adjust staff deployment as closely as possible to the 
fluctuation of customer flows and sales. 
These working time regimes translate flexibility for most retail employees into 
availability to the needs of the employer and not into more choices on how to 
work (Jany-Catrice and Lehndorff 2002). At the very bottom of the scale are so-
called ‘zero hour contracts’ as found in British retail (Usdaw 1998b). Here the 
employees do not know in advance when and how long they will work. Far more 
common in retail, however, are employment contracts which guarantee 
employees a certain minimum of working hours but allow for maximum flexibility 
when it comes to working time schedules. A German department store chain 
reported in 1997 that 70% of its staff were employed on the basis of such 
individual contracts - fixing the monthly income but not the effective working time 
(Hertie 1997). These schedules then often include clauses to allow for short-term 
changes because of unplanned staff shortages due, for example, to sickness 
(Groof et al. 1997; Kirsch et al. 1999). 
The demand of retailers for flexibility finds further expression in the employment 
structures. So-called atypical employment has become the standard in much of 
the retail industry (Wirth 1994; Lehndorff 2001; Schüttpelz/Deniz 2001; Dribbusch 
2003). Female part-time employees are the core of the workforce in most of the 
retail industry (with the exception of the DIY sector). 
In 2002, almost half of the retail employees in Germany were part-timers (ver.di 
2003) and 57% of employees in British retail and in 1998 even 66% of the Dutch 
retail workforce worked part-time (Dribbusch 2003, 62-63). Part-time employment 
is particularly predominant amongst sales staff and cashiers, but less pronounced 
amongst (often male) managers (e.g. Toye et al. 1993; Kirsch et al. 1999). In 
1997 German supermarkets employed on average 71% part-time employees 
(Kirsch et al. 1999, 75). Kirsch et al (1999) found in British supermarkets often 
proportions of 80% and more part-time staff and in Dutch food retail full-time 
employees sometimes accounted for less than 10% of staff. Substantial 
proportions of part-time employees are also found in the big department stores. 
Large groups of employees within part-time employment work comparably few 
weekly hours. According to the European Labour Force Survey the proportion of 
part-time employees in 1999 with less than 15 hours per week was 38.2% of all 
part-time employees in Great Britain, 37.9% in western Germany, 19.9% in 
eastern Germany and 51.8% in the Netherlands (Jany-Catrice/Lehndorff 2002, 
511). In many of the Dutch supermarkets, however, even 50% of all employees 
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work less than 12 hours per week (cf. Tilaart 1993, 53; Kirsch et al. 1999) and a 
big department store company in the Netherlands had at the end of the 1990s 
almost 40% of its staff employed on this basis (see table 1 below). 
Table 1: Employment structure of a Dutch department store company 
Year Employee
s 
Full-
time 
Part-time  
(monthly 
wage)1 
Part-time 
(hourly 
wage)2 
Part-
time 
< 12h 
1995/9
6 
13,200 28.6% 28.3% 9.5% 33.6% 
1998/9
9 
14,700 24.8% 22.0% 14.2% 39.0% 
Source: own calculation based on the employment statistic of a large Dutch 
department store chain. 
1) Part-time employees with a fixed monthly salary based on an average weekly 
working time of 20 hours. The effective working time may differ between 12 and 
28 hours.  
2) Part-time employees, who work between 12 and 30 hours per week and are 
paid the hours they work. 
The result of these working time and employment structures is a fragmentation of 
the workforce at the workplace. There is no longer any day where all employees 
meet. Joint tea-breaks are scarce. Some employees, such as shelf fillers who 
start to work before the stores open or those confined to twilight and night shifts 
in British supermarkets, may find it difficult to keep in contact with the other 
colleagues at work. The same applies to those who only work on Saturdays and 
Sundays.  
Trade union organising is much more difficult if the daily communication is 
hampered by a great variety of individual working time patterns. Even if the 
organising process is successful it remains a problem to secure a continuous 
contact between members and trade union representatives. Finally, as a 
consequence of this fragmentation, it is hard for retail employees in general and 
in particular for those who work in isolation in small outlets to develop a feeling of 
social cohesion, let alone a sense of power.  
Finally trade unions have to struggle with the staff turnover in retail (Dribbusch 
2003, 64). Job tenure in retail in all three countries is considerably below the 
average of the economy (Lehndorff 2001, 138). 
All three trade unions address part-time workers and have managed to 
substantially increase membership amongst them. But, according to trade union 
representatives, the chance to recruit part-time employees decreases with the 
number of weekly working hours (Dribbusch 2003). This is not a specific problem 
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of retail (Klandermans and Visser 1995; Visser 2000) but if, as in the Dutch 
supermarkets, 50% and more of shop workers are in this employment category it 
becomes a particular challenge for unions. 
There is still some research to be done about the reasons for this low propensity 
to join a union amongst employees with this kind of job. It seems plausible that 
employees with few working hours and sometimes additionally on a temporary 
contract are not attracted to trade unions - which in general aim at long-term 
improvements of pay and conditions (Diemel 1962). But it remains a question to 
be examined as to whether this is really the main reason for the low membership 
levels amongst small part-time and often temporary staff. 
There could also be some kind of mutual disregard. Despite their large numbers 
in some of the retail outlets, employees with precarious jobs are often not 
regarded as a genuine part of the workforce by workplace representatives. Trade 
union officials admit that these workers are sometimes not regarded as a target 
group for trade union recruitment, not because they would not be welcomed in 
the union, but because they would be rather unlikely to join (Dribbusch 2003). All 
of the three unions offer the full range of their services to all members regardless 
of their employment category. 
The difficulties to recruit these employees, however, are part of the general 
problem all three unions face when trying to increase their share of younger 
members (Dribbusch 2003). In 1994, 31% of all part-time employees in British 
retail were younger than 25. Many of these young part-timers work only a few 
weekly hours. At the British retailer Sainsbury 20% of all employees in 1998 were 
still involved in some kind of formal education (Usdaw 1998c). In 1997 the 
proportion of German retail employees under the age of 25 amongst part-time 
employees with fewer than 15 hours per week was 37% in western Germany and 
31% in eastern Germany (ISG 1997) and in the Netherlands the high proportion 
of employees under the age of 25 in food retail (66% in 1998; HBD 2000, 31) 
corresponds with the extensive employment of 'short' part-timers in the 
supermarkets. Apart from the general problems many trade unions face in 
recruiting young people (Dribbusch 2003; Freeman and Diamond 2003) it seems 
likely that many of these young workers regard their job in retail as a passing 
employment and if they are confronted with problems at work they might be more 
prepared to switch employment than older workers. 
In the late 1980s a British study established that as many as 75% of part-time 
employees under the age of 25 stayed less than a year at one retail employer 
(Coca-Cola Retailing Research Group Europe 1989) and the high annual staff 
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turnover in Dutch supermarkets of 41% is to a great extent attributed to young 
students finishing school. 
None of the three unions has yet found an ideal way of involving employees with 
marginal part-time or temporary contracts in the unions, but for all of them, what 
the then Deputy General Secretary of Usdaw stated in 1993 holds true: 
"We have problems of access to those people and we have large stores where 
there are 100-plus working shifts. We may have difficulty persuading part-time, 
temporary, often casual-type jobs, to join the trade union, but we have a whole 
lot more problems if we cannot even talk to them, if we cannot even approach 
them" (Bill Connor, Usdaw ADM 1993, S. 129) 
Organising dispersed workplaces 
The structure of the retail industry fosters a balance of power favourable to 
employers and the dispersion and fragmentation of the workforce make it hard to 
challenge this power relationship. But against the background of the various 
industrial relations frameworks which are in place, all three unions have 
developed approaches to the problem of how to organise workers across 
dispersed workplaces. 
Germany: Establishing work place presence via works councils 
For German trade unions taking the hurdle of organising means establishing a 
works council where those members of works council who are in the union act 
effectively as trade union representatives.9 To establish a works council the union 
is able to follow a statutory procedure. Every trade union represented in the 
establishment (which is legally defined as having at least one member in the 
establishment) has the right to take the initiative to establish a works council. For 
these purposes the company has to grant access to trade union representatives 
to the premises concerned. Usually an approach to establish a works council is 
only started if there is a nucleus of union members prepared to push through the 
procedure even against employer resistance. Within German retail there is a 
marked difference between employers who are used to dealing with the unions 
and others who are well known as union busters. As a starting point for a new 
                                            
9 Attempts by the union to organise distinctive structures of lay officials ("Vertrauensleute") similar to those who exist in some of the 
big chemical or metal factories in addition to the works councils never went very far in retail. The main reason for this is the 
limited potential of activists in the establishments. In retail trade union activists are in nearly all cases members of a works 
council or in other words: either there is a works council or there is no organised union presence.  
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organising drive the union often takes advantage of a particular conflict in the 
establishment or company.10 
In Germany the trade union does not need recognition to have access to the 
workplaces. In case of conflict it is sufficient if the union can prove it has one 
member within the company in question in order to be allowed access to all 
workplaces. However, especially in the big German supermarket, food discount 
or chemist chains which sometimes have several thousands of outlets with 
comparably little staff, a shop by shop approach to organising would not only 
overstretch the personnel resources of the trade union but also involve the 
problem that not all of the outlets were above the legal threshold for the 
establishment of a works council. Ver.di tries to at least partly overcome the 
dispersion of the workplaces by concluding collective agreements according to 
section 3 of the Works Constitution Act in order to create larger works council 
units. It is, however, very difficult to force such collective agreements on an 
unwilling company. So in practice most of these agreements have been reached 
after negotiations by way of mutual consent. 
One outstanding case, where ver.di's predecessor HBV succeeded in pushing 
through such an agreement against fierce employer opposition was in 1994/95 
during the campaign involving the chemist Schlecker. In this case the HBV was 
not only able to mobilise many employees because it could show that the 
company did not pay the collectively agreed rates of pay, but it managed 
furthermore to mount a very effective public campaign which scandalised the way 
in which the company prevented its employees from being properly represented 
(Huhn 2001). 
The final collective agreement with Schlecker defined 328 business units for 
which works councils could be established. Most units did not have 300 
employees, some numbered fewer than 100 employees. Following this 
agreement some very positive examples of successful organising and recruitment 
showed that even under adverse circumstances such as in the case of Schlecker 
considerable levels of memberships can be obtained if members of works 
councils are convinced that their bargaining position towards management is 
strengthened by membership gains and if these works council members are 
                                            
10 A very effective argument used to be that certain companies did not pay the proper rates as they should have done according to 
collective agreements. Such conflicts allowed the union to demonstrate very quick its effectiveness as agreed wage rates are 
legally enforceable. Central bargaining on a regional basis is still the prevalent pattern in German retail, but since 2000 the 
employers federations refused to cooperate as in the past in the procedure to declare the collective agreements generally 
binding for all employers in the industry. This allows now that certain companies are no longer bound to the general agreements. 
Whether this will decentralise bargaining in the future remains to be seen. 
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encouraged and supported by committed full-time officials. All in all, however, the 
HBV found it very difficult to effectively implement this agreement for all of the 
328 units. It did not prove easy to find enough members willing to be involved in 
works council work and some local trade union districts, which had a high degree 
of autonomy within HBV, also set other priorities because they considered the 
organising process to be too time consuming and costly, given the limited 
membership potential in the comparably small business units. 
At the other end of the scale we find some collective agreements in food retail 
where the business unit for which a works council is set up is so large that it 
becomes a problem for the works council to represent employees in a huge 
number of outlets spread over a distance of several hundreds of kilometres. Here 
the degree of effective recruitment depends very much on the commitment of the 
members of the works councils  and day-to-day recruitment is difficult because of 
the limited contact even committed works council members can establish within 
the single outlets. 
Organising in German retail is further complicated by management strategies to 
convert outlets into franchises which then are no longer formal parts of the name-
giving company and therefore drop out of existing agreements. Sometimes this 
strategy of splitting-up an existing company is even explicitly used to counter an 
organising strategy. The obvious answer in these cases would be to focus less on 
the establishing of works councils and to promote small networks of trade union 
lay representatives – a strategy which is being discussed within ver.di. However, 
the problem of finding committed activists and organising trade union support for 
a large number of small workplaces remains. 
A particular problem to which the trade union has not yet found an answer is the 
fact that a considerable number of employees are concentrated in shopping malls 
and high streets and , in so far as they are not working in a big store, are isolated 
at single stalls or small outlets. 
Great Britain: Organising the employer 
The Usdaw approach can best be described as 'organising the employer' (Heery 
2003). This strategy is the direct reflection of an industrial relations framework 
which, up to the Employment Relations Act 1999 (ERA), made it rather easy for 
companies to deny union officials access to their premises. This is a problem that 
both German and Dutch unions do not face within the legal framework they are 
confronted with. 
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The fragmented structure of the industry also makes it nearly impossible to force 
recognition upon an unwilling employer. Therefore, the union has made a virtue 
of necessity and follows a concise approach of bargaining for recognition under 
the slogan of "we have an interest in seeing your business prosper" (Usdaw 
1998b). This approach is pursued through head-office activities and the 
organising of the outlets usually only starts when an agreement is reached.11 
Open conflicts and adversarial campaigns are, in contrast to the German 
situation, not very common and have even to be avoided if the union wants to 
iuphold its image as a non adversarial mediator of workplace conflicts.  
Usdaw's prime example is certainly the social partnership agreement with Tesco. 
It has allowed Usdaw to secure a membership level which even exceeds that in 
most of the remaining Co-op societies. The problem is that by far not all retailers 
are willing to join in similar recognition agreements. The union has made 
considerable progress with some of the other big retailers in recent years but it 
often remains a problem to establish trade union representatives in all of the 
stores for which recognition has been secured. Trade union officers have to 
service up to several hundreds of outlets and this makes it difficult to visit each 
store more than once in a while despite the very high priority Usdaw gives to 
organising and recruitment. From time to time the trade union enters into national 
recruitment campaigns where full-time officers are delegated to target chosen 
companies where the union is recognised, in order to promote membership and 
to identify new trade union representatives. 
Usdaw is aware that it cannot rely on employer support alone if it wants to extend 
its membership and the union is also aware that such support can quickly vanish 
if management changes or the company is sold. Even the Tesco management 
had considered the advantages of derecognising Usdaw despite an established 
relationship since the 1950s before it decided to enter into a partnership 
agreement with the union in 1998. Usdaw has therefore strongly invested in 
additional staff who are specialised in organising and recruitment and right from 
its start in 1998 has been a sponsor of trainees of the TUC's Organising 
Academy (Heery et al. 2000; 2001). The Organising Academy is a one year 
training programme composed of a number of courses at the TUC and practical 
work experience in conjunction with experienced organisers in the sponsoring 
union. Most of the trainees are offered jobs in Usdaw after they graduated from 
the Academy. They work as so-called Recruitment Development Officers i.e. as 
                                            
11 An exception to that is the situation at Sainsbury where Usdaw has to win recognition store by store and the "first try" is granted 
by the company either to Usdaw or the T&G. 
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travelling organisers with a particular emphasis on identifying and winning new 
lay representatives. In the meantime the trade union has also established its own 
organising academy. In order to mobilise additional personnel resources the trade 
union also tries to negotiate with employers to release lay activists for a certain 
period of time, in which they can be involved in recruitment activities beyond their 
own workplace. 
However, albeit the union thinks that the new legislation since 1999 had a 
positive impact on the industrial relations climate and Usdaw succeeded in 
winning new recognition agreements, a considerable number of retailers still 
prefer not to deal with the union. Access becomes a particular problem in the 
large British shopping centres where thousands of employees work but cannot be 
personally addressed because even the surrounding car parks and pathways of 
those centres are private property. 
An interesting approach to organising a dispersed workforce is called community 
unionism (Wills 2001). The Battersea and Wandsworth Trades Union Council 
(BWTUC) in London has formed an Organising Centre which has also 
established a working conjunction with the regional Usdaw official and entered 
into the recruitment of shop workers in the locality by visiting small high street 
shops on a regular basis. This kind of approach, however, is in western Europe 
only at the beginning stage, and it remains to be seen how successful it will be 
and whether it will be expanded. 
The Netherlands: The Shopping-Centre-Project 
The most far-reaching attempt to tackle this particular problem was the so-called 
shopping centre project (Project Vakbondswerk in de Winkelcentra, VWC) carried 
out by by the FNV Dienstenbond. 
The starting point for FNV Dienstenbond was in 1990 when, following a high 
profile campaign against shop opening hours, the trade union realised that it had 
reached unprecedented publicity but had no organised presence in most of the 
retail industry - apart from some of the big retail companies (FNV Dienstenbond 
1990). The question was how to reach the many employees who did not work in 
the big retail companies. Many of them worked in shops which were located in 
one of the very common small shopping centres which are characteristic for the 
Dutch retail landscape. The idea was to set up so-called information and service 
teams comprised of three lay activists (kaderleden). These teams were to 
regularly distribute trade union information in the stores, give advice and finally 
also recruit members. When the project finally started in 1992 the trade union 
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wanted to target all shopping centres with at least 40 shops and about 250 
employees. Each centre should have at least one outlet of one of the major 
retailers. Finally about 400 shopping centres with together 85,000 employees met 
the criteria (FNV Dienstenbond 1995). 
In 1995 the trade union had managed to establish teams in 122 shopping 
centres. The average team, however, did not comprise three but only two 
members. The evaluation of the membership balance was positive. Even when 
the hopes of 1990 to boost trade union density across retail up to 20% had 
proved to be completely unrealistic, membership development was above the 
average in those shopping centres where an information and service team had 
been established. The emphasis of the work of the teams, however, was on 
giving information and advice. Direct recruitment was, as for Dutch trade union 
activists in retail in general, very much regarded as a subordinated task 
(Dribbusch 2003). 
A major problem was the high turnover in retail, which affected not only the 
industry but also the composition of the teams. Furthermore, research in two 
shopping centres showed that because of the short job tenure many employees 
had not experienced the trade union campaigns of the late 1980s as shop 
workers and consequently did not value these activities (Wijmans 1991). After a 
further three years, in which the project had been cross subsidised by the overall 
membership which could be achieved in retail in these years, it became clear that 
the project had reached its limits. 122 teams with 250 activists and contact 
persons proved that the project had been consolidated but had lost its dynamism 
(FNV Bondgenoten [Project VWC] 1998). The assessment identified as the main 
reason for this stagnation the fact that the union had not been able to mobilise 
more members to become activists and that it had even been hard to replace 
departing team members. Particular difficulties were finding members prepared to 
act beyond their 'own' work place and the high demands placed on the activists. 
A 1993 study had already ascertained that the task of a lay activist was regarded 
in retail as time consuming and difficult (Wijmans 1993). The setting up of a 
special team of three full-time officials in 1997 to identify additional activists did 
not result in creating more teams. As a result of this situation the project was not 
further expanded and became integrated in the general trade union work within 
retail without the further allowance of any special budget. The trade union, which 
had invested considerable funds in the project now set other priorities. The 
overall balance, however, remained positive. It was noted that compared with the 
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average profile of the trade union activist more women and young employees 
were involved in the teams. 
Despite its limits, the shopping centre project proved to be the most ambitious 
and far-reaching approach towards establishing a continuous trade union 
presence for shop workers at different outlets and even in different enterprises. 
The activists involved effectively overcame the borders of their 'own' store. 
Considering the fact that not only FNV Bondgenoten, but also Usdaw and 
HBV/ver.di, experienced that it is particularly difficult to find activists for such 
external trade union work, the number of 250 lay activists involved in the 
shopping centre project remains remarkable. 
In the Netherlands some kinds of works councils exist which have considerably 
fewer rights than their German counterparts. Although on paper they are 
mandatory for all companies with more than 50 employees, in fact, they only exist 
where there is an interest in establishing such structures. The Dutch unions had 
until recently kept their distances to these structures which were in the past 
presided over by the employer (cf. Visser 1992, 1993). Historically absent from 
the workplace, but heavily involved in tripartite institutions on national and 
industry levels, Dutch unions only started a few decades ago to build a work 
place presence through networks of lay officials acting independently from the 
works councils.12 The key to the development of the membership in retail is 
therefore to expand the lay network and not necessarily to establish works 
councils. As gaining access to the workplace is usually no problem for 
Bondgenoten officials, the main hurdle they have to tackle in unorganised 
workplaces is how to win new members who are prepared to get involved in lay 
activity. The big number of small outlets and the limited time budgets of the 
officials combine here to make this a difficult task. Open employer resistance has 
been reported in some cases, but does not seem to play the same role as in 
Germany or Great Britain. 
Recruitment approaches 
In Germany and the Netherlands direct recruitment of members by full-time 
officials is the exception. An experiment with a full-time recruiter in food retail in 
Germany was regarded by the union district as a success, but not applied 
nationally. Unlike their colleagues at HBV and Bondgenoten, officials in Usdaw 
are expected to devote a considerable amount of time to recruitment. The direct 
                                            
12 The works council for Albert Hijn the biggest food retailer which covers about 40.000 employees has only 15 members which are 
not all members of the union. 
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recruitment is usually done during official visits to the outlets for which the terms 
are usually set within the recognition agreement. The full-time approaches to 
recruitment are further strengthened through the strong commitment of Usdaw to 
a professional training of staff for organising and recruitment tasks as expressed 
by its commitment to the Organising Academy of the TUC. This innovative 
attempt to develop the organising and recruitment culture through full-time 
organisers has no equivalent in the Dutch or German trade union movement. 
Nevertheless the daily face to face recruitment is generally seen by all three 
unions as a core task of the lay officials.13 
In Germany it is usually up to the trade union members of the works councils 
whether and how they approach the employees. The practice to enrol new 
employees at day one of employment which has some tradition in the metal 
industries is not very common in retail. The intensity of recruitment differs 
remarkably and not all HBV or ver.di works council members do it in a systematic 
way. The attitude to recruit when employees need help or advice is widespread. 
A traditional way used to be to recruit young employees when they entered into 
apprenticeships, an approach which has diminished with the number of such 
apprenticeships in retail. It is very common to intensify recruitment before the 
annual bargaining rounds. In the context of bargaining rounds the lay official may, 
for example together with a full-time official, do some kind of recruitment 
campaign in the canteen or may personally approach the unorganised employees 
by using the bargaining issue and perhaps the likelihood of an industrial conflict 
as an opportunity to recruit. As members of the works council have access to all 
work places and usually have their own offices, there are many ways to approach 
not yet organised employees if they wish to do so. The importance attached to 
recruitment by the works council determines to a large degree the membership 
level in a given constituency.14 
As their German colleagues, the Usdaw shop stewards recruit when employees 
approach them with a problem. Furthermore the union encourages the stewards 
to use the induction sessions to win new employees. Many agreements provide 
facilities for this and although some stewards are reluctant to speak up at those 
                                            
13 Very difficult to quantify is the number of members joining because they were approached by organised colleagues. A Dutch 
study in retail revealed that 61% of the members of the FNV Dienstenbond in retail who were interviewed said to have at least 
once tried to convince a colleague to join (Inter/View 1997, 11).  
14 It is inherent in the institution of the works council, which is elected by all employees and which is no trade union structure by law, 
that some works council members may not see the necessity to recruit as they are legally not responsible towards the union but 
the entire workforce. The union usually expects at least some activity in exchange for professional advice and training given to 
the union members in the councils. 
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meetings this seems to be an important recruitment channel. As the turnover in 
British retail is very high, organising new employees is an ongoing task, 
especially in the big superstores. Due to the prevalent check-off system members 
do usually not take their membership with them when changing employment or 
entering periods of unemployment. Nearly all of the stewards interviewed 
regarded recruitment as an important activity. The union regularly enters into 
special recruitment campaigns where full-time officials and lay representatives 
join forces to expand membership in selected companies. A distinctive feature of 
Usdaw recruitment approaches is that the union tries to involve the company in 
the activities. This usually takes the form of a jointly signed letter to the 
employees in which the company declares its general support for the union, but it 
may also go as far as adding the membership form to the job application form15, 
something which is unthinkable in German retail. 
It was surprising that the Bondgenoten lay officials stated in the interviews that 
recruitment was explicitly not an important part of their trade union work. To 
approach employees directly with the request to join was often seen as 
inappropriate. It was added by an official that this would be annoying for both the 
potential member and the lay official. The question of joining is obviously only 
raised if someone has a problem or has received some help. A widespread view 
seems to be that joining the union is a kind of automatic result of a good 
performance of the union in bargaining and at the workplace. Lay officials often 
attributed the daily difficulties of recruitment to image problems of the union.16 
The very passive approach to recruitment contrasts with the positive membership 
development the union had in the last decade (albeit starting from a very low 
level). Part of the success must be attributed to an expansion of the workforce. 
The most remarkable growth rates were nevertheless realised during some 
industrial conflicts over bargaining issues and the extension of shop opening 
hours. The organised expansion of trade union presence to a great number of 
shopping centres in the 1990s helped as well. 
"Recruiting is a skill. Like all skills it needs training for and updating." (Usdaw 
1998a, 6) 
This statement of Usdaw holds for the other two unions as well, but only the 
British shop workers union offers any specific training for the trade union 
                                            
15 This is especially the case at Tesco and proved to be very effective. Officials admitted that this procedure has the disadvantage 
that some employees may not know they join a union. 
16 This view is in contrast to most of the literature which agrees that the union is generally not a contested organisation but is widely 
accepted (cf. Klandermans and Visser 1995). 
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representatives. In the meantime the trade union has even established its own 
Organising Academy. 
In the HBV some individual advice and help is given through full-time officials, but 
there is no general training on those issues. At the time of the research, the 
Bondgenoten did not know of any special recruitment training either. 
Telephone hotlines 
Telephone service hotlines are operated by all three unions. A national or local 
service number can be a useful tool for all people when first contacting the union 
and for service members - especially in workplaces with no trade union 
representative to speak to. Ver.di established a national service hotline in spring 
2002 and in its trade union paper reported a very good start in summer 2002 with 
up to 2,000 calls daily (cf. ver.di Publik, August 2002, 20). HBV in Hamburg 
established that 15% of its new members in 1995 had joined following a 
telephone request for information or advice (Dribbusch 2003, 154-155) and in 
2003 the telephone service centre of ver.di in Hamburg was responsible for 20% 
of new members. 
A telephone hotline which is not properly working is a major nuisance, be it that it 
is most of the time occupied or not available or be it that the persons in charge 
cannot handle the specific requests of the caller. This is what the FNV 
Bondgenoten learned when they sourced their membership service out – a 
decision which finally had to be revised (Dribbusch 2003). 
Telephone hotlines which are operated effectively are a good tool to improve 
overall trade union availability, just as the possibility to contact the trade unions 
via the Internet. The experience of trade unions so far has not shown that even 
the best hotline can finally be a substitute for the personal contact. Many 
problems facing employees and trade union members require a detailed and 
personal knowledge not only of the collective agreement in place but also of the 
employer and the workplace. 
The Internet offers new possibilities to distribute information and to make the 
union known to employees. Unions offer prospective members the possibility to 
join by filling in an electronic form and it will be interesting to see how successful 
this method of joining a union will be. 
The challenge in retail is to organise and to service a dispersed work force. 
However, it remains to be seen to what extent the success of approaching 
employees via the web and telephone hotlines will be and whether it will replace 
 21
  
the personal face to face contact between trade union representative and 
employees on a large scale. 
Prospects 
Trade unions in retail certainly have one of the biggest potential memberships. 
There is not only hope, some success stories can also be told. Nevertheless this 
is all far from sufficient to get a real influence in the industry.  
With regard to the high membership levels which trade unions have been able to 
secure in parts of the retail industry, it is obvious that there is no specific anti-
trade union resentment amongst retail employees. Despite adverse external 
conditions trade unions still have a potential for growth in the industry and it is up 
to the trade unions to set the priorities and implement appropriate strategies to 
organise and recruit (cf. Dribbusch 2003). 
Given the huge number of employees in retail, however, even a moderate 
increase in overall density requires the organising of large numbers of new 
workplaces and the enrolling of tens of thousands of new members. 
The dilemma is that those employees in low pay services who probably depend 
most on a union because their market power is limited, can simultaneously 
mobilise only the lowest funds to enable organising activities. Under these 
circumstances organising and to some extent even the servicing of members in 
retail will always have to rely to a great extent on lay commitment. Again there is 
a dilemma that this commitment is difficult to develop under the conditions of 
dispersion and fragmentation. This fragmentation of the workforce is the main 
obstacle to be overcome when organising in retail. If availability is at the root of 
the problem, then the future of trade unions in retail depends on whether they 
succeed in building an organised presence in a highly fragmented territory. 
Access certainly is a big problem, but as can be seen in Germany and the 
Netherlands, access alone does not automatically lead to a sustainable 
membership development. Organised union activity is required and it can be 
demonstrated in the case of all three unions that this makes the difference. 
On the other hand: voluntarism alone does not solve the problem of limited 
resources. The problem of prohibitive costs becomes even more important when 
we take into consideration the servicing of a dispersed workforce. Under these 
circumstances cross-subsidising amongst trade unions is an option, but difficult to 
translate into action. Even if this happens, organising -and to some extent 
servicing - members in retail will always have to rely to a great extent on lay 
commitment. 
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A best practice model made up of elements from all three unions would consist of 
the German provisions for works councils, the commitment to organising as 
demonstrated by Usdaw plus the Organising Academy of the TUC, and the 
shopping centre approach of the FNV Bondgenoten.  
The experience of other unions is of course not easily transferable. The 
organising culture is linked to a certain institutional framework and the influence 
of unions on the development of the latter is limited. But it seems to be worth not 
taking every tradition for granted and to think about options unions have. When 
discussing the future of unions in a united Europe a combination of much of the 
continental institutional framework with the Anglo-Saxon emphasis on organising 
which has emerged in the last decade could perhaps offer a perspective for trade 
unions. To put it simply, the motto could be: 'works councils plus Organising 
Academy'. 
Finally, the problem to organise a highly fragmented workforce is not only a 
challenge in retail, but in almost all private services, especially in the low pay 
sector. This becomes evident if one examines, for example, the hotel and 
catering industry, or the newly emerging highly volatile call-centres. As for the 
latter the additional problem arises that jobs can be quite easily relocated to avoid 
unionisation. It is therefore hard to imagine that the task of organising private 
services will be successfully managed for more than a minority of workers without 
some institutional help through statutory protection and encouragement of trade 
union membership. 
The future of trade unions in low pay services will therefore depend on whether 
modern societies are prepared to protect the human right to organise in a trade 
union in a way appropriate to the problem – a right that is de facto denied to 
growing number of employees. This would require legal provisions which 
effectively allow unions access to every worker at the workplace and secure 
encompassing rights of individual and collective representation. 
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